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Abstract Model checking is an established technique
to formally verify automation systems which are re-
quired to be trusted. However, for sufficiently complex
systems model checking becomes computationally in-
feasible. On the other hand, testing, which offers less
reliability, often does not present a serious computa-
tional challenge. Searching for synergies between these
two approaches, this paper proposes a framework to
ensure reliability of industrial automation systems by
means of hybrid use of model checking and testing.
This framework represents a way to achieve a trade-
off between verification reliability and computational
complexity which has not yet been explored in other
approaches. Instead of undergoing usual model check-
ing, system requirements are checked only on particular
system behaviors which represent a test suite achiev-
ing coverage for both the system and the requirements.
Then, all stages of the framework support the case of
a closed-loop model, where not only the controller, but
also the plant is modeled.
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1 Introduction
Ensuring reliability is a major issue related to mission-
critical automation systems. Speaking of functional re-
quirements, two approaches to address this issue are
known. In simulation-aided testing, the automation sys-
tem is exercised on a finite number of behavior sce-
narios which are obtained according to some method-
ology, such as model-based testing (MBT) [5, 31]. In
formal verification by model checking [11], behaviors of
the formal model of the automation system are exhaus-
tively explored. These two approaches have strengths
and weaknesses. Simulation-aided testing is limited to
particular behavior scenarios, but it is fast and does not
require specific knowledge other than the domain one.
Thus, it is largely adopted in industry. Model check-
ing, on the other hand, is more reliable, but much more
resource-intensive and requires expertise in formal meth-
ods.
Failures of mission-critical automation systems are
not tolerated. Thus, their functional correctness must
be assured with formal methods. Nowadays, they are
used in certain cases [17, 26, 27], but far not ubiqui-
tously. Speaking of model checking, its application is
especially complicated for large systems. Modeling and
verifying them straightforwardly would likely result in
infeasible resource (CPU time and RAM) consump-
tion. Various solutions of this computational complex-
ity problem are known, ranging from naive ones, like
omission of certain aspects of the system or applying
harsh discretization to real values, to more sophisti-
cated abstraction techniques [19,23] and compositional
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verification approaches [34]. Another solution, known
as bounded model checking (BMC) [4], limits the com-
plexity of considered behaviors of the formal model.
Unfortunately, in practical cases, approaches which
preserve the thoroughness of model checking are often
not sufficient, and one needs to sacrifice precision of ei-
ther the model (e.g., omit some of its aspects) or the
model checking algorithm (e.g., apply BMC) to make
verification feasible. On the other hand, applying sev-
eral “unsafe” approaches wherein different aspects of
model checking are affected may to some extent com-
pensate the related decrease of reliability. This moti-
vates the development of new approaches of finding
a trade-off between resource consumption and model
checking reliability.
One area wherein such an approach does not yet ex-
ist is the combined use of testing and model checking.
Previously, multiple approaches of test generation by
means of model checking were proposed [14–16]. Later,
the process of test execution was represented as a model
checking problem [7,9]. Coupling these approaches in a
single hybrid method is the topic of this paper. By view-
ing all stages of automation system testing as model
checking, the initial problem of model checking is trans-
formed to the one of testing with a related decrease of
reliability, but also with a significant performance im-
provement. At the same time, the resultant approach is
different from conventional testing by the use of tem-
poral specification during both test case generation and
execution.
More specifically, this paper proposes a framework
to ensure reliability of industrial automation systems by
hybrid use of testing and model checking. The frame-
work considers the general situation of a closed-loop
system [29], where both the controller and the con-
trolled plant are represented as formal models. Extrac-
tion of nondeterminism of the plant model into des-
ignated input variables allows convenient representa-
tion and generation of test cases, which are then used
to check temporal logic requirements specified for the
closed-loop system. Test cases are unwound into infi-
nite paths, and thus the semantics of temporal logics
is preserved. On the other hand, test cases are selected
according to coverage criteria for both the state space
of the model and the subformulas of temporal require-
ments. The framework has been implemented in a soft-
ware tool which which is written in Java and is available
online.1
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces used concepts and terms. Section 3
describes the proposed framework. Then, in Sections 4,
1 https://github.com/igor-buzhinsky/formal_testing_
in_closed_loop
the framework is applied on case studies and compared
with conventional model checking. In Section 5, it is
compared with other verification approaches. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model checking of automation systems
Model checking [11] is a formal technique of state space
analysis of a formal model. Assume that the state of
the system is time-dependent (the simplest case is log-
ical, discrete time). Then, if the formal model specifies
valid initial states of the system and rules of state tran-
sition, it becomes possible to verify properties involv-
ing the state of the system in different time instants
by performing exhaustive state space exploration. Such
properties are called temporal properties.
In linear temporal logic (LTL), several temporal op-
erators allow formulating properties over system behav-
iors represented as infinite sequences of states. Among
temporal operators are G (always), F (eventually in the
future) and X (in the next state). For example, LTL
property XG(x→ F y) specifies that starting from the
second time instant, x always implies y in one of the
future states (or in the same state where x becomes
true). The problem of LTL model checking is to deter-
mine whether the given LTL property is satisfied for all
infinite behaviors of the given model, and, if not, pro-
vide a counterexample—a behavior which violates this
property. Then, computation tree logic (CTL) examines
trees of possible system executions rather than separate
behaviors. Nevertheless, some temporal properties can
be equivalently expressed in both CTL and LTL.
From now on, the system whose correctness must
be ensured will be referred to as system under verifi-
cation (SUV). Model checking of industrial automation
systems [17,26,30,35] is distinguished by the separation
of the model of the SUV into the controller model and
the plant model. Often, only the former is prepared,
resulting in open-loop model checking. However, mod-
eling the plant (i.e., the devices with which the con-
troller works and the corresponding physical processes)
and, optionally, environmental conditions and interven-
tion of human operators, allows considering the feed-
back between the plant and the controller. The type
of model checking, which enables controller verification
in more natural conditions by considering the plant
model, is known as closed-loop model checking. Many
safety-critical properties in automation systems cannot
be described in terms of the controller’s input and out-
put variables, but require reference to plant parameters,
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therefore closed-loop model checking is a more expres-
sive and comprehensive method.
2.2 Model checking algorithms and tools
In explicit-state model checking, the state space of the
model is represented explicitly, as a state graph, or,
more precisely, as a Kripke structure [11]. Consequently,
if the state space of the model is large, its processing
becomes impossible due to excessive CPU time and,
sometimes, RAM requirements. This phenomenon is
known as state space explosion. SPIN [21] is a well-
known explicit-state model checker used primarily for
verifying multi-process systems. Its formal language is
called Promela. Promela is similar to an imperative pro-
gramming language but allows nondeterministic state-
ments.
Symbolic model checking [6] was suggested as a means
of overcoming the state space explosion issue. Its key
idea is to process states implicitly, by operating with
Boolean formulas. One of the most popular symbolic
model checkers is NuSMV [10]. Unlike Promela, NuSMV
models are specified as systems of constraints over state
variables of the SUV.
2.3 Reducing model checking complexity
A common way to mitigate model checking complexity
is abstraction, a simplification of the SUV which pre-
serves the results of model checking or alters them in
a tolerable way. Multiple abstraction approaches have
been proposed. For example, the work [23] proposed two
kinds of abstraction: control abstraction allows han-
dling of systems with unbounded structure, and data
abstraction maps variables over infinite domains to fi-
nite ones. In particular, control abstraction requires the
SUV to be modular. According to [34], another use of
modularity is to avoid repeated verification of the entire
SUV when one of its components is refined.
In [19], abstractions are proposed specifically for
PLCs (programmable logic controllers), which are dis-
tinguished by cyclic operation, wherein a single cycle
involves reading inputs, executing the PLC program,
and updating outputs. One of the abstractions skips
intermediate states of the PLC cycle, leaving only the
final values of output variables. The other one reduces
the number of variables which describe the state of the
PLC. These abstractions are applicable when the veri-
fied properties deal with extrinsic PLC behavior, which
is composed of input/output values in the end of each
cycle.
The alternative solution to handling the complex-
ity issue is to change the way how temporal proper-
ties are checked instead of modifying the model of the
SUV. Partial order reduction and cone of influence re-
duction are implemented in model checkers SPIN [21]
and NuSMV [10] respectively. Bounded model checking
(BMC) [4] is a technique of symbolic model checking
where the LTL model checking problem is reduced to
finding a satisfying assignment of a propositional for-
mula by executing a satisfiability (SAT) solver. The
reduction is done with the following limitation: only
counterexamples which can be represented with a state
sequence of the given length k are considered (note that
counterexamples still can be infinite since this sequence
may contain a cycle). This means that an LTL property
may be falsely reported to be satisfied if the given k is
insufficient. NuSMV is able to perform BMC by incre-
mentally increasing k up to the given limit.
2.4 Testing with model checkers
Test case generation by model checkers is a widely ex-
plored topic, which is thoroughly reviewed in [16]. The
main idea of such test case generation is to (1) formulate
test purposes which describe the desired properties of
test cases; (2) formulate temporal properties expressing
that test purposes are never reached—so-called never
claims; and (3) model-check never claims. The result of
model checking a never claim is either a counterexam-
ple, which is interpreted as a test case (it shows that the
never claim is violated, i.e., the test purpose is reached),
or no counterexample, meaning that the corresponding
test purpose is unreachable.
One of the ways to formulate test purposes is to
base them on coverage [5,16], a popular property which
is often required for test suites in industry. Multiple
coverage criteria are known, including structural ones
(e.g., whether a particular instruction or line of code
is executed, or a particular condition in a conditional
statement is realized) and data-based ones (e.g., cer-
tain predicates over the state space of the system are
satisfied). Another idea is to make generated test cases
distinguish the correct program and its mutants, which
are obtained by making minor syntactic changes in the
program. Coverage criteria can be also based on data
flow [32] or temporal specification [33, 36]. Much more
approaches are reviewed in [16]. Unfortunately, as these
approaches become more complex and require genera-
tion of more test cases, the time to generate the entire
test suite also grows. As a partial remedy, BMC can be
used to generate test cases faster [1, 20].
The works [7, 9] apply model checkers to deal with
test case execution rather than generation. In these
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works, which will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 5, the testing problem is limited to automation
systems.
However, by now, there is no approach which is
based on model checking and encompasses all the stages
of testing. Test case generation by model checking nei-
ther considers the test oracle problem [2], that is, dis-
tinguishing correct results of test executions from in-
correct ones, nor the question of test case execution.
On the other hand, the works [7, 9] do not propose in-
tegrated approaches of test generation and instead as-
sume that test cases and their oracles are obtained by
other means (e.g., using MBT). Coupling these two re-
search direction into a single framework is the intended
contribution of the present work.
3 Proposed framework
3.1 Plant, controller models and nondeterminism
A Mealy machine is a tuple (S, s0, I, O, δ, λ). Here, S
in a finite set of states, among which s0 ∈ S is the
initial state. Then, I is a set of input variables, each of
which has a finite set of possible values (e.g., Booleans
or integers), and O is a set of output variables. Finally,
δ : S × v(I) → S is the transition function and λ :
S × v(I) → v(O) is the output function, where v(I)
and v(O) are sets of input and output variable value
combinations respectively.
Both the plant and the controller models are viewed
as Mealy machines which pass their output variables as
input variables to each other. Technically, such state
machines can be specified in modeling languages such
as NuSMV or SPIN. From now on, the terms input vari-
ables and output variables will be referred to the ones
of the controller. The interaction of the plant and the
controller models is cycle-based: first the plant model
makes its turn, and then the controller model does.
However, if both models are represented as deter-
ministic state machines, this means that the closed-loop
model of the SUV has only one behavior. To resolve this
problem, nondeterminism is modeled as arbitrary selec-
tion of values of special variables, from now on referred
to as nondeterministic variables. In the most natural
cases, these variables correspond to inputs from human
operators or random behavior of the plant. They are
passed as input to the plant model along with the out-
put variables of the controller. This approach of ex-
tracting nondeterminism into independent variables is
useful throughout the framework.
The overview of considered models and their in-
teraction by variables is shown in Fig. 1. In addition
to previously mentioned variable kinds, plant and con-
troller models have their own internal variables, which
comprise their states. Then, the values of nondetermin-
istic variables may originate from two sources, or two
kinds of value generators: either (1) a purely nondeter-
ministic generator (natural for ordinary model checking
where the whole range of possible system behaviors is
explored), or (2) a deterministic one (to enable execu-
tion of deterministic test cases which are encoded in
these values).
Finally, although the framework is intended for closed-
loop use, the plant model can be omitted to make it ap-
plicable in the open-loop scenario. This can be done by
specifying a dummy plant model which copies the val-
ues of nondeterministic variables to input ones, making
these kinds of variables identic. Thus, plant behaviors
become arbitrary, which corresponds to the open-loop
assumptions.
3.2 Test suite model
The most notable kind of a value generator is a test
suite model. Let v1, ..., vk be the nondeterministic vari-
ables. Assume that their values belong to finite sets
V (v1), ..., V (vk) respectively. A test case of length ` is a
matrix {Ti,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ `}, where Ti,j ∈ V (vi)
specifies the value of vi on step j. Thus, a test case
specifies a concrete selection of nondeterministic vari-
able values, which fixes plant behavior. However, un-
like conventional testing, model checking considers infi-
nite behaviors of systems under examination. While ob-
tained as finite sequences (Section 3.4), test cases will
be executed (Section 3.5) as infinite ones by looping the
finite sequence from its beginning (such looping satis-
fies the need to have infinite paths to check temporal
properties). Encoding such looping behavior in model
checkers NuSMV and SPIN (i.e., producing textually
represented test case models which precisely represent
test cases) is straightforward: the next step of the test
case is calculated as (j mod `) + 1.
In the definition of the test case above, we have
neglected the test oracle problem. The solution devel-
oped in this paper is to use temporal specifications for
this purpose—the ones which would have been other-
wise used for ordinary model checking. For a fixed SUV,
such oracles are independent from concrete test cases.
A test suite is a set of test cases. The corresponding
test suite model (i.e., exact test suite representation in
a formal language such as NuSMV or SPIN) works as
follows, behaving as a value generator. Before the first
combination of values is generated, the test case to be
executed is selected nondeterministically (technically,
this is done by assigning an index to each test case
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Nondeterministic 
variables Plant model
Internal plant 
variables
Controller model
Internal controller 
variables
Value generator: 
(1) nondeterministic generator
or (2) test suite
Input 
variables
Output 
variables
Fig. 1 Model interaction overview and variable kinds. The elements of the diagram which differ the framework from the
traditional closed-loop verification methodology are shown in bold
Informal 
requirements
Formal (LTL or 
CTL) requirements
SUV
Formal model of 
the SUV (plant 
and controller)
Test 
suite
Testing 
results
Stage 2. 
Requirements 
formulation
Stage 1. 
Formal 
modeling
Stage 3. 
Coverage test 
generation
Stage 4. 
Test case 
execution
Fig. 2 Artifacts and stages of the framework. The stages which comprise the novelty of the framework are shown in bold
and nondeterministically selecting this index). Then,
the values of the chosen test case are generated on each
step, being looped over as described above. As a re-
sult, recalling that every other model in the closed-loop
system is deterministic, the test suite model causes the
system’s state graph to be formed of a number of inde-
pendent infinite paths. Model checking algorithms, nev-
ertheless, can process such graphs in finite time since
each infinite path has a lasso shape [11], i.e., a finite
prefix followed by a loop.
3.3 Stages of the framework
The proposed framework comprises four stages:
1. Formal modeling. As a prerequisite of applying
the framework, one needs to prepare the formal mod-
els of the plant and the controller. The controller
model may be generated automatically based on the
original controller code (e.g., as in [12]), and the
plant model can be not only created manually, but
also constructed based on system behavior traces
(e.g., as in [8,25]). As explained below, these models
must be available in both a symbolic verifier (e.g.,
NuSMV) and an explicit-state verifier (e.g., SPIN).
2. Requirements formulation. Functional require-
ments to the SUV are formulated in temporal logics,
such as LTL or CTL. This process is identical to the
one commonly done in model checking of automa-
tion systems and thus is not discussed further. These
temporal requirements will be used as test oracles
for test cases generated on the next stage. Note that
this stage requires expertise in formal methods.
3. Coverage test generation. The value generator
of type 1 (according to Fig. 1) produces the val-
ues of all nondeterministic variables arbitrarily and
independently. During a symbolic model checking
run, this is needed to find sequences of values which
achieve coverage of the SUV’s state space and sub-
formulas of temporal requirements. These sequences
form the test suite.
4. Test case execution. Test cases found on the pre-
vious stage are executed by using the value genera-
tor of type 2 (according to Fig. 1) during an explicit-
state model checking run. As a result, some of them
may be reported as counterexamples to the require-
ments formulated on stage 2.
Stages 3 and 4, which represent the novelty of the
framework, are examined in detail below. All the stages
are also presented in Fig. 2 together with their inputs
and outputs.
3.4 Coverage test generation
In Section 2.4, the general idea of test case generation
with model checking was mentioned together with sev-
eral approaches of selecting test purposes. The cover-
age test generation stage of the proposed framework
adapts these ideas to the considered problem. Since
both a large number of test cases to be generated and
the complexity of test case generation criteria influ-
ence the time required to generate the test suite, a
reasonable limitation of both factors is needed: other-
wise, the proposed approach would fail to compete with
other model checking complexity reduction approaches
in performance. On the other hand, since the consid-
ered SUVs are closed-loop, not only the coverage of the
controller model can be assured, but also the one of
the plant model. Moreover, according to the principles
of MBT, coverage of the specification is also helpful.
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To sum up, the chosen test purposes need to cover all
available artifacts (plant model, controller model, spec-
ification) while remaining lightweight.
The most straightforward test purposes capable of
covering each of the artifacts are data-based. Suppose
that p is a Boolean predicate of the state space of the
SUV. The coverage goal to reach p can be formulated in
LTL as G¬p, where G means “always”. Speaking of the
coverage of the state space of the closed-loop model, the
simplest way to select p is according to state coverage:
p = (v = v0), where v is a variable and v0 ∈ V (v).
The same principle can be applied to specification
coverage. In MBT, the formal model of requirements
is usually represented as a state machine or a system
of pre- and postconditions and is covered structurally.
In our case, structural coverage of temporal require-
ments can be interpreted as coverage of their subfor-
mulas. Previously, an approach [33] has been proposed
to achieve subformula coverage of LTL formulas based
on the idea of refuting formula mutations by generated
test cases. However, this approach is too computation-
ally intensive for our purposes since it involves running
a model checker multiple times to check formulas whose
complexity is similar to the LTL specification. Thus, the
complexity of coverage test generation becomes compa-
rable with the one of actual model checking, which we
intend to avoid in our testing framework. To achieve
better performance, we use a simpler approach which
only involves coverage of Boolean subformulas (i.e., the
subformulas of the LTL formula which do not contain
temporal operators): if f is a Boolean subformula of
one of temporal (either LTL or CTL) requirements of
the SUV, then p ∈ {f,¬f} (to cover both true and false
values of f).
The ideas given above are summarized in the test
suite generation algorithm (Alg. 1) and are explained
in detail below. For each variable v in the system (of
either of five variable kinds) and for each value v0 in
the set of v’s possible values V (v), never claim G(v 6=
v0) is considered (lines 2–4). Similarly, a never claim is
considered for both values of each Boolean subformula
of each temporal requirement (lines 5–7). Then, a set
of processed never claims is maintained.
For each never claim which is not yet processed, a
model checking run is performed to verify this never
claim (line 10). We assume that plant and controller
models follow the idea of interpretation abstraction [19]:
a single step of the overall formal model corresponds
to a single execution of both the plant and the con-
troller models viewed as Mealy machines (for example,
if the controller represents a PLC program, then all its
internal assignments are atomic). This abstraction is
extremely beneficial for test execution and allows rep-
resenting temporal properties more conveniently. The
interaction of elements shown in Fig. 1 is implemented
as follows: on each discrete time step, the nondetermin-
istic generator produces a tuple of values of nondeter-
ministic variables. In symbolic verifier NuSMV, such
a generator has an empty implementation since no re-
strictions are placed on these variables. These values,
together with previous-step output values of the con-
troller (or default values on the first step) are passed
to the plant model, which produces an input tuple for
the controller. The controller model transforms these
inputs into outputs.
If the model checking run is performed using BMC,
then it depends on the bound k = `max − 1. This run
either detects that the never claim is violated and re-
turns a counterexample c representing a test case reach-
ing the coverage goal, or proves this claim (returns
null), which means that no test case limited by `max
exists which reaches this goal. Regardless of the result
of model checking, this never claim is marked as pro-
cessed (line 11). Then, if the test case has been found
(line 12), it is added to the test suite (line 13). It might
also happen that the found test case covers some other
unprocessed coverage goals—in this case such goals are
not considered further (lines 14–18). Function covers
is implemented in a way which does not involve execu-
tion of c, and thus checking for coverage of other goals
is faster than trying to generate a test case for each
coverage goal.
Above, test cases have been mentioned to be gen-
erated by means of model checking. One may execute
explicit-state or symbolic BDD-based model checking
algorithms, the advantage of which is the ability to gen-
erate counterexamples or prove their absence regardless
of the bound on length `max. Symbolic model checking
is superior in this case as the one capable of handling
large state spaces, while in explicit-state model checking
the number of states in the model grows exponentially
with the test case length required to achieve coverage.
Then, it was found that applying BDD-based exact
symbolic model checking for test case generation is com-
parable with usual BDD-based symbolic model check-
ing of the closed-loop system in terms of required time.
Thus, the goal of applying the proposed framework to
reduce model checking time would not be reached. Con-
sequently, instead of BDD-based model checking, we
apply BMC, which has also been reported to be effi-
cient for test case generation in [1, 20]. In this case the
bound k = `max − 1 becomes relevant. In the tool im-
plementing the framework, symbolic generation of test
suites is implemented by utilizing NuSMV.
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Algorithm 1: Test suite generation algorithm
Data: model S with a nondeterministic value
generator, set V of all variables in S, maximum
test case length `max, set R of temporal
requirements
Result: test suite T
1 neverClaims← ∅; processed← ∅; T ← ∅;
2 foreach v ∈ V, v0 ∈ V (v) do
3 neverClaims← neverClaims ∪ {G(v 6= v0)};
4 end
5 foreach r ∈ R, Boolean subformula f of r do
6 neverClaims← neverClaims ∪ {G f} ∪ {G¬f};
7 end
8 foreach p ∈ neverClaims do
9 if p /∈ processed then
10 c← modelCheck(S, p, k = `max − 1);
11 processed← processed ∪ {p};
12 if c 6= null then
13 T ← T ∪ {c};
14 foreach p′ ∈ neverClaims \ processed do
15 if covers(c, p′) then
16 processed← processed ∪ {p′};
17 end
18 end
19 end
20 end
21 end
3.5 Test suite execution
When the test suite is generated, it remains to run the
test cases against the requirements formulated on the
second stage of the framework (Section 3.3). Similarly
to test case generation and developing the ideas of [7,9],
this stage is also performed by means of model checking.
On each step of model execution, a new tuple of non-
deterministic values is produced by the test suite model
(as described in Section 3.2), which is represented in a
language of an explicit-state model checker. This model,
implementing a value generator of type 2 according to
Fig. 1, exhibits nondeterminism only on the first step,
when the test case is selected. Then, the extraction of
nondeterministic variables into a separate variable kind
becomes useful: it makes model execution deterministic
once their values are fixed and the test case is selected,
and thus subsequent model checking is equivalent to
conventional test case execution.
The rest of value passing and execution of plant
and controller models is similar to the one in the test
case generation stage. However, the purpose of model
checking is now different. During test case generation,
a path (specified by the values of nondeterministic vari-
ables) was searched which achieves a particular cover-
age goal. In test case execution, the purpose is to check
whether the requirements of the SUV are satisfied on
test cases, which are viewed as infinite extensions of
values sequences found on the previous stage. Thus, if
a counterexample is found by the model checker, it cor-
responds to one of the test cases. If the model checker
finds no counterexample, this means that the require-
ment is satisfied for the entire test suite. The described
procedure is repeated for each requirement of the SUV.
We stress the importance of performing test case
execution in an explicit-state model checker (in con-
trast to test case generation), since this makes verifi-
cation significantly faster [9]. This is explained by de-
terminism of test cases, which prevents state space ex-
plosion: the model checking algorithm examines only a
small number of lasso-shaped paths. However, the need
to perform explicit-state model checking in addition to
symbolic one implies the need to model the SUV in the
languages of both a symbolic verifier (such as NuSMV)
and an explicit-state verifier (such as SPIN). In the tool
implementing the framework, test case execution is im-
plemented by running SPIN on test cases represented
in Promela.
4 Case studies
We evaluate the proposed framework on two case stud-
ies. The first case study used in this paper comprises an
elevator control system. It is based on a Structured Text
(ST) PLC application implemented in CODESYS2 to-
gether with the elevator model and its visualization
(Fig. 3). The elevator is designed for a three-story build-
ing. Every floor of the building has a button to call
the elevator; three buttons (for each floor) are also lo-
cated in the elevator’s car. When a button is pressed,
it remains on (i.e., cannot be pressed again) until the
elevator arrives at the designated floor and its doors
are opened. The controller implements this very be-
havior; however, when multiple floors are requested in-
finitely, the implementation of the controller prohibits
some floors from being reached (for example, when the
car is at floor 2 and floors 1 and 3 are called, the car
will always go up). When the doors open, they remain
open for some time before closing.
The second case study is a control system for a
pick-and-place manipulator (PnP). A similar system
has been previously used in [28]. The visualization of
the PnP system in nxtSTUDIO3 is shown in Fig. 4. The
plant comprises three input trays, on which workpieces
can be placed from outside of the system, an output
tray, which is the destination of all input workpieces,
and the manipulator itself. The manipulator comprises
two horizontal pneumatic cylinders and one vertical
2 https://www.codesys.com/
3 https://www.nxtcontrol.com/en/engineering/
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Fig. 3 Visualization of the elevator simulation model (the
car is at floor 3)
Fig. 4 Visualization of the pick-and-place simulation model
(the manipulator is in its initial position, and a workpiece is
present on input tray 2)
cylinder, all of which are capable of extension and re-
traction, and a suction unit. The implementation of the
controller from our case study, which has been prepared
in ST, works as follows: if there is a workpiece on some
input tray, the workpiece from the tray with the mini-
mum number is taken (only the trays with workpieces
are counted), and then placed on the output tray.
4.1 Formal models
NuSMV and Promela models for the case studies were
prepared both manually and by using automatic model
code generation. They employ discrete elevator car and
cylinder positions and logical time. For generated mod-
els, this discretization was implemented by simplifying
ST source code. Since Promela is an imperative lan-
guage, like ST, automatic generation of Promela models
is straightforward and thus differences between manual
and automatically generated Promela models were in-
significant. In contrast, for NuSMV, which is a declar-
ative language, such a conversion is more complex. Al-
though some NuSMV model generation techniques were
proposed [12, 18], they are not publicly available, and
hence we implemented our own converter to handle the
subset of ST that we use. This converter is less effi-
cient than the one in [12], which leads to a practical
outcome: the ability to evaluate the proposed frame-
work on NuSMV models which are hard for NuSMV to
process.
To evaluate the proposed framework on problems of
varying complexity, the models were generalized to sup-
port arbitrary complexity value n, which corresponds
to the number of floors (elevator case study), or the
number of horizontal cylinders (PnP case study). This
was done by producing models by scripts which take n
as a parameter. In the case of automatically generated
models, the simplified ST code was produced by such a
script, and only then the models were generated.
Below, we consider elevator models with 3 ≤ n ≤ 15
floors. In each model, the range of elevator car positions
is 0..3(n−1), where position 3(i−1) corresponds to floor
i and other positions are intermediate. Then, one logical
time step corresponds to one second, and the elevator
car moves with the speed of one position per time step.
PnP models are only considered for 2 ≤ n ≤ 5
due to their exponential complexity: a model with n
horizontal cylinders is able to reach 2n different trays,
2n − 1 of which are input ones. This requires support-
ing a longer range of positions for each new horizontal
cylinder: for the model with n cylinders, the number of
possible positions of the longest cylinder is 2n−1 + 1.
The vertical cylinder always has only three positions
(retracted, intermediate, extended). Similarly to eleva-
tor models, each cylinder moves with the speed of one
position per time step.
The complexity of models (for elevator models, only
for several values of n) is given in Table 1. State space
sizes, which are equal for manual and generated models,
were computed with NuSMV. Section 4.4 will also clar-
ify the complexity of models in symbolic model check-
ing.
4.2 Temporal requirements
4.2.1 Elevator case study
For each elevator model, a set of the following 4n tem-
poral requirements was generated in both LTL and CTL
(floor index i ranges from 1 to n):
1. ERTi1: always, if the car is between floors, the doors
of floor i shall be closed;
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Table 1 Complexity of case studies
n
Number of variables LOCc, manual models LOCc, generated models State space
N/da Input Output Internalb NuSMV Promelad NuSMV Promela size
E
le
v
a
to
r
3 6 15 5 8 58 76 154 209 1.2 · 104
6 12 30 8 11 97 76 319 470 1.8 · 107
9 18 45 11 14 136 76 538 839 2.1 · 1010
12 24 60 14 17 175 76 811 1316 2.0 · 1013
15 30 75 17 20 214 76 1138 1901 1.8 · 1016
P
n
P
2 3 10 4 9 71 95 116 123 5.7 · 102
3 7 16 5 10 91 95 151 156 1.1 · 105
4 15 26 6 11 119 95 206 205 2.6 · 109
5 29 42 7 12 163 95 301 286 —e
aNondeterministic. bSum of the numbers of plant and controller internal variables; the value is shown only for generated models.
cLines of code, sum for plant and controller models. dConstant since loops over all floors, cylinders, or workpieces were used.
eUnknown since time limit (24 hours) was exceeded.
2. ERTi2: always, if either of the buttons of floor i is
pressed, either the car shall eventually arrive at floor
i and the doors of floor i shall open, or one of the
buttons of other floors is pressed;
3. ERTi3: always, if the doors of floor i become open,
they shall remain open for two additional time steps
and then start closing;
4. ERTi4: always, if the doors of floor i start closing
and either of the buttons of floor i is pressed, the
doors shall reopen in two times steps.
To properly evaluate the framework, requirements
which were supposed to be violated were also prepared
(differences from the previous requirements are written
in italic):
1. ERFi1: always, if the car is between floors, the doors
of floor i shall be open;
2. ERFi2: always, if either of the buttons of floor i is
pressed, the car shall eventually arrive at floor i and
the doors of floor i shall open (regardless of other
buttons being possibly pressed);
3. ERFi3: always, if the doors of floor i become open,
they shall remain open for one additional time step
and then start closing;
4. ERFi4: always, if the doors of floor i start closing
and either of the buttons of floor i is pressed, the
doors shall reopen in one time step.
4.2.2 Pick-and-place manipulator case study
For each PnP model, the following requirements were
specified for each input tray (input tray index j ranges
from 1 to 2n − 1):
1. PRTj1: always, if a workpiece is on input tray j, it
will be eventually taken, then eventually put on the
output tray, and then the manipulator will eventu-
ally return to its initial position;
2. PRTj2: always, if a workpiece is on input tray j, this
tray will eventually be empty, unless a new work-
piece is added to this tray;
3. PRTj3: the cylinders of the manipulator are not po-
sitioned to take a workpiece from input tray j until
a workpiece appears on it, or are never positioned
like that if it never appears.
Then, these requirements were modified to make
them violated:
1. PRFj1: always, if a workpiece is on input tray j, it
will be eventually taken, then eventually put on the
output tray, and then the manipulator will even-
tually retract the vertical cylinder and extend some
horizontal cylinder ;
2. PRFj2: always, if a workpiece is on input tray j, this
tray will eventually be empty (regardless of whether
this workpiece is further added again);
3. PRFj3, 1 ≤ j < 2n − 1: the horizontal cylinders of
the manipulator are not positioned to take a work-
piece from input tray j until a workpiece appears
on it, or are never positioned like that if it never
appears (this requirement is false since the manipu-
lator may be attempting to take a workpiece with a
larger index).
Note that the number of requirements is exponen-
tial of n. For n = 5, this makes testing and verification
sufficiently complex to compensate the relative simplic-
ity of this PnP model compared to the elevator model
with n = 15 (see Table 1).
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4.3 Example of a formal model
The listing below provides an example of a Promela
elevator model for n = 3 floors, which is suitable for
test suite execution in SPIN. It includes variable dec-
larations (according to variable kinds described in Sec-
tion 3.1), a test suite model with two test cases, each
with two elements, a manually prepared plant model,
and a stub of the controller model (the entire code is
not shown due to its length). The small size of the test
suite was chosen only for the purpose of demonstra-
tion; the framework uses much larger case studies as
explained in Section 4.4. The variables of the test suite
model comprise the index of the test case in the test
suite ( test index) and the current step of test case
execution ( test step). Then, the main Promela pro-
cess init is declared as an infinite do loop of atomic
steps (intermediate computations within these steps are
invisible in model checking). Each step comprises test
case selection (this is done only once per SUV run),
setting nondeterministic variables according to the se-
lected test case, incrementing test case step, and finally
executing plant and controller models. The LTL for-
mula in end of the listing corresponds to ERT11. Note
that array indexing in Promela is zero-based, and thus
floors, test cases and their steps in the listing below are
indexed from zero rather than one.
// List of door states
mtype {d_closed, d_opening, d_open, d_closing}
// Input variables
bool on_floor[3] = 0;
bool door_closed[3] = 0, door_open[3] = 0;
bool button[3] = 0, call[3] = 0;
// Output variables
bool up = 0, down = 0, open[3] = 0;
// Nondeterministic variables
bool user_floor_button[3] = 0;
bool user_cabin_button[3] = 0;
// Plant internal variables
int elevator_pos = 0;
mtype door_state[3] = d_closed;
// Controller internal variables
int door_timer = 0;
// Test suite variables
int _test_step = 0, _test_index = -1;
init { do :: atomic {
if // Test suite: test case selection
:: _test_index == -1 ->
if
:: _test_index = 0;
:: _test_index = 1;
fi
:: else -> ;
fi
if // Test suite: variable value selection
:: _test_index == 0 ->
if
:: _test_step == 0 -> ;
:: else ->
user_floor_button[0] = 1;
user_floor_button[1] = 1;
fi
:: else ->
if
:: _test_step == 0 ->
user_cabin_button[1] = 1;
:: else ->
user_floor_button[2] = 1;
fi
fi
_test_step = (_test_step + 1) % 2;
d_step { // Plant execution
elevator_pos = elevator_pos + up - down;
elevator_pos = (elevator_pos > 6 -> 6 :
elevator_pos);
elevator_pos = (elevator_pos < 0 -> 0 :
elevator_pos);
int f; // floor
for (f : 0..2) {
on_floor[f] = elevator_pos == 3 * f;
door_state[f] = (open[f] ->
(door_state[f] == d_closed || door_state[f]
== d_closing -> d_opening : d_open) :
(door_state[f] == d_open || door_state[f]
== d_opening -> d_closing : d_closed));
door_closed[f] = door_state[f] == d_closed;
door_open[f] = door_state[f] == d_open;
button[f] = (on_floor[f] && door_open[f] -> 0 :
(user_f_button[f] -> 1 : button[f]));
call[f] = (on_floop[f] && door_open[f] -> 0 :
(user_cabin_button[f] -> 1 : call[f]));
}
}
d_step { // Controller execution
// <60 lines of code are omitted>
}
} od }
ltl ERT 1 1 { X([](!on_floor[0] && !on_floor[1] &&
!on_floor[2] -> door_closed[0])) }
4.4 Evaluation and comparison with model checking
The proposed testing framework was evaluated and com-
pared with model checking. For elevator models, the
bound `max for test case length was set to 3n + 6, as
3(n − 1) test elements are required for the elevator to
reach the highest position, and the remaining 9 ele-
ments are required to open and close the doors—this
realizes not only state coverage, but also subformula
coverage. For PnP models, we empirically determined
that `max = 11 is sufficient for 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, and `max = 17
is sufficient for n = 5.
All experiments were performed on the Intel Core
i7-4510U CPU with the clock rate of 2 GHz. Table 2
presents the results of applying the proposed testing
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framework to both manual and generated elevator and
PnP models for various n: execution times of test gen-
eration in NuSMV, test execution in SPIN, and the
total time of applying the framework (the sum of the
first two times) are shown. Elevator models with n ≤ 5
are omitted since they do not represent interest due to
fast termination of all compared approaches. On the
other hand, with the growth of n, test generation time
starts differing significantly between manual and gener-
ated models. In particular, test generation did not ter-
minate within the time limit of 12 hours for generated
elevator models, which are more complex according to
Table 1, with n ≥ 14.
All the requirements ERTim, 1 ≤ m ≤ 4, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and PRTjm, 1 ≤ m ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n − 1 for all n (except
unfinished framework runs) were found to be satisfied.
However, since the proposed framework is an inexact
technique, model checking on test cases may miss vio-
lations of some properties—the numbers of such viola-
tions are also shown in the table. The overall number of
properties which can potentially be falsely reported to
be true, for elevator models, is 4n—this is the number
of properties ERFim. For PnP models, this number is
3 · 2n − 4, which is the number of properties PRFjm.
Conventional model checking was also performed.
Explicit-state model checking became impractically long
for n ≥ 5, so its results are not reported. Since the
requirements are available in both LTL and CTL, the
cases of both LTL and CTL symbolic BDD-based model
checking were examined. Then, BMC is only possible
for LTL properties, and represents particular interest
for comparison since this is a technique which preserves
the verified system but verifies it less thoroughly than
BDD-based model checking. If the maximum possible
bound for counterexamples kopt is known, then BMC
becomes precise. Determining kopt may be difficult for
arbitrary LTL properties and formal models, but for
the requirements of types ERFim and PRF
j
m this can
be done relatively easy. Corresponding calculations are
omitted to save space, but the results are as follows:
1. for elevator models, kopt = 3n+ 5 and is realized on
requirements of the type ERFi4;
2. for PnP models, kopt = 2
n + 12 and is realized on
requirements of the type PRFj1.
In addition to the bound k = kopt, a smaller one,
k = bkopt/2c (the brackets denote rounding down),
was also used to obtain lower BMC execution times
which would be comparable with the ones of applying
the framework. On elevator models, BMC with such a
bound can be shown to miss violations of exactly n+ 1
temporal properties out of 4n false ones, where missed
violations are limited to requirements of types ERFi3
and ERFi4. The results of comparing the framework
with various types of model checking are also given in
Table 2.
Speaking of elevator models, for large n our exam-
ples become challenging for exact model checking. Ex-
ecution times of BDD-based model checking are low in
some cases, but are unstable, which is especially visible
on manual models. In contrast, BMC execution times
grow predictably, but faster than the ones of applying
the framework. In almost all experiments, BMC with
k = bkopt/2c is slower than the framework; what is
more, it misses more violations of temporal properties
compared to the framework. We also note that although
sometimes CTL model checking outperforms the frame-
work, LTL is more common in the automation systems
context, and only particular LTL requirements can be
represented in CTL (this case study was designed to
make it possible for all the used requirements).
On PnP models, BDD-based verification is clearly
slower than the other approaches, although the number
of experiments is less. The execution time of the testing
framework was again lower than the one of BMC with
k = bkopt/2c, although now it misses more property
violations.
5 Comparison with other approaches of
integrating testing and model checking
Multiple approaches of test case generation were pro-
posed in previous studies [16]. The framework proposed
in the present paper uses the most common and compu-
tationally simple ideas of these approaches, but is not
a test case generation approach itself. Yet, it includes a
simple technique to cover subformulas of temporal spec-
ifications, whose use needs to be justified in comparison
with the approach described in [33]. In this approach,
the used coverage criterion is more elaborate than sim-
ple reachability of subformula values: intuitively, it re-
quires the test cases to exclude different mutations of
the LTL specification f . To achieve such coverage, for
each atomic proposition of f , a model checker is run on
a modified version of f . However, the goal of our testing
framework is to overcome the computational difficulty
of verifying f , which is impossible with such a proce-
dure. This justifies the use of our simpler technique,
although its utility with respect to test suite reliability
is clearly lower.
The work [7] reduces the problem of testing to the
one of model checking. However, in this method each
test case is encoded as a list of input/output pairs: for a
given sequence of inputs from the plant the output se-
quence required from the controller is fixed. Specifying
the output behavior precisely limits the capabilities of
testing. In contrast, temporal specifications used in the
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Table 2 The performance of the framework and usual model checking on the Elevator and the PnP case studies
n
Test suite Framework time (s) Model checking time (s) Missed property violations
sizea GENb EXECc Total CTLd LTLe 1
2
BMCf BMCg Framework 1
2
BMCf
M
a
n
u
a
ll
y
p
re
p
a
re
d
m
o
d
el
s
E
le
v
a
to
r
6 23/240 4 12 16 10 80 7 45 1 7
7 27/324 6 15 21 39 485 13 95 1 8
8 31/420 9 18 27 26 197 20 191 1 9
9 35/528 13 22 35 24 166 40 339 2 10
10 39/648 18 27 45 17509 3525 62 604 1 11
11 43/780 24 35 59 731 TLh 127 1035 0 12
12 47/924 34 42 77 71 3512 186 2176 1 13
13 51/1080 42 44 87 1355 19897 324 3022 3 14
14 56/1249 71 64 136 8130 TLh 389 3784 2 15
15 59/1428 106 77 183 TLh TLh 557 6508 2 16
P
n
P
2 7/25 1 5 6 2 9 1 4 4 6
3 11/40 2 15 17 268 4591 8 55 8 14
4 17/82 6 43 49 TLh TLh 111 853 16 15
5 26/215 150 236 386 TLh TLh 3383 TLh 32 24
G
en
er
a
te
d
m
o
d
el
s
E
le
v
a
to
r
6 24/242 12 10 23 14 101 36 239 2 7
7 33/331 29 13 42 39 548 125 780 0 8
8 34/424 73 16 89 99 1851 446 2806 0 9
9 39/533 220 19 239 697 4533 1858 9794 0 10
10 47/657 732 24 756 1818 34516 6413 34193 1 11
11 47/785 3212 28 3240 2618 22807 26221 TLh 2 12
12 50/928 7348 34 7381 27258 TLh TLh TLh 1 13
13 54/1084 29874 43 29917 8543 TLh TLh TLh 0 14
14 — TLh — TLh TLh TLh TLh TLh — —
15 — TLh — TLh TLh TLh TLh TLh — —
P
n
P
2 9/31 1 5 6 1 3 1 7 4 6
3 13/45 3 12 15 73 1588 13 79 7 14
4 32/104 31 38 69 TLh TLh 704 4729 15 14
5 65/164 3432 150 3582 TLh TLh TLh TLh 31 —
aGiven in the format <number of test cases>/<total number of elements>. bTest generation time. cTest execution time.
dBDD-based CTL model checking. eBDD-based LTL model checking. fLTL BMC with k = bkopt/2c. gLTL BMC with k = kopt.
hTime limit (12 hours) was exceeded.
present paper rather forbid patterns of undesired in-
put/output sequences. Then, the work [7] employs the
formalism of net condition/event systems (NCES), the
maintenance of tools for which has finished.
The contributions of [7] are developed in [9], where
NuSMV is used as a modeling formalism. The general
test case execution idea of [9] is partially adopted in the
present work, but the following differences are notable:
1. In [9], the nondeterminism of the closed-loop model
is achieved by making the plant model nondetermin-
istic, rather than extracting nondeterministic vari-
ables.
2. In [9], test cases are represented as finite-state ac-
ceptors which are obtained using MBT, instead of
input sequences in the present work. Consequently,
(1) test oracles are specified within test cases, not
separately in temporal specifications, and (2) test
case generation is not fully automatic.
3. Although the work [9] considers test case execution
for closed-loop SUVs, it does not propose a formal
method of quality assurance, but rather explores
different use cases of test case execution by model
checkers assuming that the test suite is given.
To sum up, the proposed framework differs from the
aforementioned approaches by binding two research di-
rections together: test case generation and execution
using model checkers. This connection has not been
done previously and includes the following novel ele-
ments: (1) support of closed-loop SUVs, (2) isolation
of nondeterminism into separate variables, (3) the se-
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lection of computationally simple coverage criteria for
the controller model, the plant model and the tempo-
ral specification, (4) the use of temporal requirements
as test oracles, and (5) looping test cases to maintain
the semantics of the temporal requirements unchanged
during test case execution.
One more approach is built on top of ideas differ-
ent from the ones discussed above. In [14], testing and
model checking are combined in a loop of incremental
model generation: the model of the system is gener-
ated based on behavior traces, then this model is ver-
ified, and obtained counterexamples are added to the
test suite comprised of behavior traces. Thus, this ap-
proach incrementally improves both the test suite and
the model of the system. The work [14] differs from the
present one by the employed methodology: the system
is treated as a black box rather than a white box. The
benefit of such an approach is the lack of need of a
formal model.
Finally, runtime verification [24] is a technique of
checking properties during SUV execution by supple-
menting the SUV with correctness monitors which exe-
cute in parallel with the SUV. Consequently, differently
from model checking, conclusions of runtime verifica-
tion must be drawn based on finite executions of the
SUV. On the other hand, runtime verification can be
run on the actual SUV or, in the case of automation
systems, on the model of SUV which is richer than the
one prepared for model checking (such as a simulation
model). Properties to be checked in runtime verification
are based on system specification and, in particular, can
be equivalent to the ones representable in LTL. How-
ever, due to the need to observe finite traces, checking
some LTL properties (liveness ones) becomes impossi-
ble. The question of selecting simulations to be executed
is similar to the one of test case selection. To sum up,
runtime verification is a testing approach which avoids
consideration of formal models and thus is significantly
different from the one proposed in this paper.
6 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, a framework for industrial automation
systems has been proposed that methodologically lies
between testing and formal verification. Viewed as a
method of testing, the framework incorporates an ap-
proach to generate test suites based on coverage with
oracles formulated as temporal properties. To generate
and run such test suites, the SUV is examined at the
formal level, which is not the case in conventional test-
ing. As shown in [9], such an examination has a number
of potential benefits, including the lack of the need to
wait until the SUV executes. The entirely formal view
also differentiates the framework from runtime verifi-
cation. Viewed as a method of formal verification, the
framework binds previously proposed approaches of test
case generation and execution using model checking and
becomes a complement to existing techniques which re-
duce model checking complexity. Like BMC, it suggests
a reduced form of verification, searching for a trade-off
between verification reliability and feasibility, but the
approach to reduction is different.
However, achieving any sort of coverage cannot guar-
antee that the generated test cases would contain coun-
terexamples to all temporal properties which are actu-
ally violated for the SUV. It is rather advised to apply
the framework together with BMC, runtime verification
and various abstraction techniques. To conclude, the
framework represents a verification technique different
from existing ones and hence can supplement them in
ensuring reliability of automation systems.
Two ideas proposed in the framework deserve sepa-
rate discussion. First, symbolic and explicit-state model
checkers have been used to achieve different purposes:
while symbolic model checker NuSMV was needed to
generate test cases, explicit-state model checker SPIN
was used to execute them. The shortcoming of this ap-
proach is that both NuSMV and Promela formal mod-
els are needed for the considered system. They may be
difficult to obtain since these languages require declara-
tive and imperative model description, respectively. On
the other hand, such models can be obtained automati-
cally, as demonstrated for the case of generated elevator
models. Another possible solution may involve using a
verifier which supports both symbolic and explicit-state
model checking, such as LTSmin [22].
The second idea is the one of extracting the nonde-
terminism of the plant model into separate variables.
One can imagine a more straightforward solution: the
plant is modeled as a nondeterministic state machine,
test cases are generated as sequences of input and out-
put values, and then these sequences are checked against
the temporal requirements. The reason of not choosing
this path is efficiency:
1. BMC would become unusable for test case gener-
ation as producing finite input/output sequences
which cannot be extended to infinite ones (loop-
ing would create incorrect plant/controller interac-
tions);
2. the applicability of the cone of influence reduction
of NuSMV would be greatly lowered as much more
variables need to be included into test cases;
3. this verbosity of test suites would also slow down
model compilation in SPIN, which is done prior to
verification.
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The performed study has several limitations which
can be addressed in future work. First, the issue of de-
termining a suitable test case length during test case
generation has not been considered in the general case.
A possible solution is to increase it incrementally un-
til system coverage stops growing. Then, applying the
framework to check liveness properties, which require
infinite behavior traces to show their violation, may be
problematic as the transformation of finite test cases to
infinite ones is by now somewhat arbitrary: test cases
are looped infinitely from the beginning. Future work
may also involve improving the developed tool by inte-
grating it with approaches of automatic formal model
generation, such as [12,13,18], and user-friendly model
checking, including counterexample explanation tech-
niques [3]. The latter would help the user to understand
what happens in the SUV when a violated test case is
executed, and whether this violation is connected with
modeling or reveals an actual fault in the SUV.
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